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COMMENT
THE ACTION OF NULLITY UNDER LOUISIANA CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE ARTICLE 2004
Article 2004 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure states in
part, "A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be an-
nulled."' The comments to article 2004 state that its source provisions
are articles 607 and 613 of the 1870 Code of Practice, which were reen-
actments of corresponding articles in the 1825 Code of Practice. 2 Com-
ments in the Projet of 1825 indicate that the purpose of the rule was to
redress injustices in the rendering of judgments that could not be reme-
died through new trials or appeals. 3 But the sweeping language of article
2004 does not suggest limits to the application of the rule, and a literal
interpretation of its terms could lead to misapplication. 4 This comment
will attempt to clarify the scope of the article by reviewing the legislation
and jurisprudence from which the current provision is derived and by
analyzing the two requirements which the Louisiana Supreme Court
utilizes to assess the validity of claims under article 2004. Additionally,
I. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2004 provides:
A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.
An action to annul a judgment on these grounds must be brought within one year
of the discovery by the plaintiff in the nullity action of the fraud or ill practices.
2. La. Code of Practice art. 607 (1870) provided:
A definitive judgment may be annulled in all cases where it appears that it has
been obtained through fraud, or other ill practices on the part of the party in whose
favor it was rendered; as if he had obtained the same by bribing the judge or the
witnesses, or by producing forged documents, or by denying having received the pay-
ment of a sum, the receipt of which the defendant had lost or could not find at the
time, but has found since the rendering of the judgment.
La. Code of Practice art. 613 (1870) provided:
When a judgment has been obtained through fraud on the part of the plaintiff,
or because the defendant had lost or mislaid the receipt given to him by the plaintiff,
the action for annulling such judgment must be brought within the year after the fraud
has been discovered, or the receipt found.
3. Projet of La. Code of Practice 1825, at 97 (Official Reprint, 1938).
The redactors determined that such articles were needed to provide the corrective
function served by the courts of cassation in France and the courts of chancery in England.
Id. This corrective function is met by the common law states and the federal government
through the equitable action to annul unfair judgments. E.g., Crim v. Handley, 94 U.S. 652
(1876). In some cases it is done through statutes concerning this problem. Eg., FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b); MASS. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b). See Note, 32 IND. L.J. 205 (1956)
for a look at the equitable and statutory remedies in a common law state.
4. This was the result of a literal interpretation of article 2004 in Johnson v. Jones-
Journel, 306 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), discussed in text at notes 41-47, infra.
19781 COMMENT
this comment will survey those general types of activities that the courts
have determined to fall within the ambit of actionable fraud and ill prac-
tices.
Early Interpretations
The action for nullification is an extraordinary remedy5 and the
courts very early determined that this remedy must be granted with
"great circumspection." '6 This caution results from the conflict between
the goal of rendering justice and the precept that there must be an end to
litigation.7 Since there is a presumption in favor of the validity of a judg-
ment,8 the plaintiff in a suit to nullify a judgment must make a strong
showing to prevail. 9
However, the courts' interpretation of the rule was not as restrictive
as a literal reading of article 607 would have permitted. Repeatedly the
courts refused to limit the action of nullity to the examples specifically
enumerated in article 607,10 finding that the examples were included by
way of illustration. I I Additionally, the decisions indicated that the courts
recognized a distinction between fraud and ill practices in that ill prac-
tice is broader and contemplates innocent acts which result from such
things as accident, mistake, or ignorance.' 2 Any improper procedure
which enabled a party to obtain a definitive judgment came within the
meaning of the article,' 3 and such practice need not be accompanied by
fraud. 14
5. Chinn v. First Municipality of New Orleans, I Rob. 523 (La. 1842).
6. Norris v. Fristoe, 3 La. Ann. 646, 647 (1848).
7. Eg., First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 174 La. 692, 699, 141 So. 379, 381 (1932);
Norris v. Fristoe, 3 La. Ann. 646, 647 (1848); McMicken v. Millaudon, 2 La. 180, 182
(1831).
8. E.g., Moss v. Drost, 130 La. 285, 287, 57 So. 929, 930 (1912); Heroman v. Louisi-
ana Inst. of Deaf& Dumb, 34 La. Ann. 805, 814 (1882); Homey v. Scott, 171 So. 172, 177-
78 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
9. See text at notes 30-34, infra, on the burden of proof.
10. See note 2, supra, for the text of La. Code of Practice art. 607 (1870).
I1. Eg., Miller v. Miller, 156 La. 46, 51, 100 So. 45, 46 (1924); City of New Orleans v.
LeBourgeois "50 La. Ann. 591, 592, 23 So. 542, 542 (1898); Lazarus v. McGuirk, 42 La.
Ann. 194, 201\8 So. 253, 255 (1890). In one case, Derbigny v. Peirce, 18 La. 551 (1841), the
court did hold the list to be restrictive but this decision was considered as overruled in
Perry v. Rue, 31 La. Ann. 287, 288 (1879).
12. E.g., Succession of Gilmore, 157 La. 130, 133, 102 So. 94, 95 (1924); Norris v.
Fristoe, 3 La. Ann. 646, 647 (1848); Beauchamp v. McMicken, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 605, 607-08
(La. 1829); St. Mary v. St. Mary, 175 So. 2d 893, 896 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Tapp v.
Guaranty Fin. Co., 158 So. 2d 228, 233 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1963), cerl. denied, 245 La. 640,
160 So. 2d 228 (1964).
13. Alonso v. Bowers, 222 La. 1093, 1098, 64 So. 2d 443,444 (1953).
14. Schneckenberger v. John Bonura & Co., 130 So. 870 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930). See
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Although the courts gave a broad meaning to the rule, they imposed
one firm limitation upon its application-the plaintiff could not substi-
tute an action in nullity for an appeal. '5 The purpose of the article was to
provide relief against defects not appearing in the record and for which
an appeal would afford no remedy. 16 Consequently, that a judgment was
merely erroneous was no ground for a suit in nullity.' 7
Aside from this restriction the decisions recognized that the trial
judge had great discretion in applying the rule' 8 and that the texts of
equity were the principal guide in determining when annulment was
proper. 19 Thus article 607 was interpreted to give Louisiana courts the
power to annul judgments "where a case present[ed] facts, on which, in
the other states of the Union, a court of equity would interfere."'20
The courts of equity, in addition to fraud, recognized mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, and excusable neglect as grounds for relief.2 1 The es-
sential elements of a cause of action for equitable relief have been
described as follows: (1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good
conscience, be enforced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action
on which the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which
prevented the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of
his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of the de-
St. Mary v. St. Mary, 175 So. 2d 893, 896 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Tapp v. Guaranty Fin.
Co., 158 So. 2d 228, 233 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), But see Adams v. Perilloux, 216 La. 566,
576, 44 So. 2d 117, 120 (1950); Dixson v. Carter, 138 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
15. Eg., Accardo v. Dimiceli, 226 La. 435, 440, 76 So. 2d 521, 522 (1954); Walsh v.
Walsh, 215 La. 1099, 1114, 42 So. 2d 860, 864, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1949); Pelletier v.
Sommerville, 112 La. 1091, 1100, 36 So. 864, 867 (1904).
16. Pelletier v. Sommerville, 112 La. 1091, 1100, 36 So. 864, 867 (1904); Hall v. Hall,
127 So. 2d 347, 351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Romero v. Galley, 79 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1955).
17. Eg., Walsh v. Walsh, 215 La. 1099, 1113, 42 So. 2d 860, 864, cert. denied, 339 U.S.
914 (1949); Conery v. His Creditors, 118 La. 864, 870, 43 So. 530, 532 (1907); Fidelity &
Cas. Co. v. Clemmons, 198 So. 2d 695, 698 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 251 La. 27, 202
So. 2d 649 (1967).
18. Eg., Miller v. Miller, 156 La. 46, 52, 100 So. 45, 46 (1924); Pelletier v. Sommer-
ville, 112 La. 1091, 1100, 36 So. 864, 867 (1904); Lazarus v. McGuirk, 42 La. Ann.. 194, 201,
8 So. 253, 255 (1890); Thomas v. Beaseley, 295 So. 2d 213, 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
19. E.g., Succession of Gilmore, 157 La. 130, 133, 102 So. 94, 95 (1924); Lazarus v.
McGuirk, 42 La. Ann. 194, 201, 8 So. 253, 255 (1890); Swain v. Sampson, 6 La. Ann. 799,
800 (1851).
20. Chinn v. First Municipality of New Orleans, I Rob. 523, 524-25 (La. 1842).
Accord, Alonso v. Bowers, 222 La. 1093, 1098, 64 So. 2d 443, 444 (1953); Lazarus v.
McGuirk, 42 La. Ann. 194, 201, 8 So. 253, 255 (1890).
21. 3 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 1246-48, 1253 (5th ed. 1925). See 46 AM. JUR.2d
Judgments §§ 792-882 (1969) for a general summary of the equitable remedy.
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fendant; (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law.2 2 Interpreting
article 607, Louisiana courts adhered to the more general principle set
out in Story's Equity Jurisprudence2 3 and fashioned from it two criteria
to determine whether a judgment had been obtained by actionable fraud
or ill practices. The two standards are that (1) the circumstances under
which the judgment was rendered show the deprivation of legal rights of
the litigant seeking relief, and (2) the enforcement of the judgment
would be unconscionable and inequitable.
24
The 1960 Revisions
In the Code of Civil Procedure the redactors combined articles 607
and 613 of the Code of Practice to produce one article providing the
grounds of the action as well as the time within which the action must be
brought.2 5 The redactors omitted the illustrations in the source article
but explained in the comments that no change in the law was thereby
effected and that judicial discretion in accordance with the prior juris-
prudence was still applicable.2 6 The one year prescriptive period27 was
maintained as well as the jurisprudential rule that the action for nullity
must be asserted in a direct action 28 in the trial court. 29 Since no change
in the law was intended, the prior jurisprudence on burden of proof and
22. J. FLEMING, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.8 (1965). See generally 3 A. FREEMAN, JUDG-
MENTS §§ 1178-1253 (5th ed. 1925); 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 822-974a
(5th ed. 1941).
23. 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 887 (2d ed. 1839) provides: "In regard to
injunctions after a judgment at law, it may be stated, as a general principle, that any fact,
which proves it to be against conscience to execute such judgment, and of which the injured
party could not have availed himself in a Court of Law, or of which he might have availed
himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negli-
gence in himself or his agents, will authorize a Court of Equity to interfere by injunction, to
restrain the adverse party from availing himself of such judgment."
24. E.g., Johnson v. Jones-Journet, 320 So. 2d 533 (La. 1975); Succession of Gilmore,
157 La. 130, 102 So. 94 (1924); City of New Orleans v. Le Bourgeois, 50 La. Ann. 591, 23
So. 542 (1898).
25. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2004, comment (a).
26. Id, comment (b).
27. The burden of proving that the fraud or ill practice was discovered within a year
rests upon the plaintiff. E.g., Emuy v. Farr, 125 La. 825, 51 So. 1003 (1910); Succession of
Dauphin, 112 La. 103, 36 So. 287 (1904); Thomas v. Beasley, 295 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1974); St. Mary v. St. Mary, 175 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
28. E.g., Pontchartrain Park Homes v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 246 La. 893, 168 So. 2d
595 (1964); Bruno v. Oviatt, 48 La. Ann. 471, 19 So. 464 (1896).
29. LA. CODE ClV. P. art. 2006. The action must be brought in the trial court even
though the judgment sought to be annulled may have been affirmed on appeal, or even
rendered by the appellate court.
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defenses attends the article. In order to establish a cause of action under
article 2004, the petitioner must allege facts from which fraud or ill prac-
tice may be unmistakably concluded.30 The petitioner seeking to annul a
judgment must also have used reasonable diligence and all available
means to prevent the wrong he suffered.3 ' Early decisions established the
policy that matters which could have been asserted as a defense to the
original suit cannot be urged in an action of nullity,3 2 and that a petition
which does not allege the absence of negligence and the exertion of dili-
gence is defective.33 Where the alleged fraud or ill practice is not con-
cealed but is open to contradiction and discreditation, lack of diligence
will defeat a suit in nullity.34 Likewise, where the defendant makes no
appearance and suffers a default judgment to be taken against him, he
must show a valid and sufficient reason for his failure to defend the
suit;35 for "there is certainly as much negligence in failing to appear and
make any defense at all, as in failing to present the defense, having ap-
peared."3 6
30. Latham v. Latham, 216 La. 791, 797, 44 So. 2d 870, 871 (1950); Homey v. Scott,
171 So. 172, 177 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936). Cf In re Phoenix Bldg. & Homestead Ass'n, 203
La. 565, 14 So. 2d 447 (1943) (mere conclusions of pleader unsupported by facts fail to state
a cause of action); First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 174 La. 692, 141 So. 379 (1932) (must
allege and prove that plaintiff has been guilty of no laches and that it would be against
good conscience to enforce the judgment).
31. Jouet v. Mortimer, 29 La. Ann. 206, 212 (1877). Cf Perry v. Rue, 31 La. Ann. 287,
288 (1879) (party applying for relief must be guilty of no laches or negligence).
32. Garlick v. Reece, 8 La. 101, 104 (1835); McMicken v. Millaudon, 2 La. 180, 181
(1831).
33. Norris v. Fristoe, 3 La. Ann. 646, 647 (1848). Cf. Chinn v. First Municipality of
New Orleans, I Rob. 523, 524 (La. 1842) (in addition to stating that petitioner has a valid
defense the petition must show that the petitioner has been guilty of no laches).
34. Eg., First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 174 La. 692, 695, 698, 141 So. 379, 380 (1932);
Moss v. Drost, 130 La. 285, 288, 57 So. 929, 930 (1912); Perry v. Rue, 31 La. Ann. 287, 288
(1879); Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 328 So. 2d 719, 721 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). Louisiana
courts have never differentiated between intrinsic fraud and extrinsic fraud in annulment
suits. Intrinsic fraud is one which occurred in the course of the trial upon a subject on
which both parties presented evidence. It usually consists of perjury or the offering of
forged evidence. Extrinsic fraud is the fraud of a kind which prevents a party from having
his day in court on one or more issues. F. JAMES, CtVIL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (1965). In
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878), the Court held that under equity, annul-
ment is available in cases of extrinsic fraud only. The redactors, by providing examples of
intrinsic fraud in the 1870 Code of Practice, article 607, ruled out the distinction in Louisi-
ana.
35. Eg., Swain v. Sampson, 6 La. Ann. 799, 800 (1851); Lyons v. Fontenot, 344 So. 2d
1068, 1071 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); GECC Leasing Corp. v. Lakeside Rambler Sales, Inc.,
277 So. 2d 249, 251 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
36. Swain v. Sampson, 6 La. Ann. 799, 800 (1851).
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The redactors did change the law by deleting a provision of article
607 requiring actionable fraud on the part of the party who obtained the
judgment, thus overruling Clark v. Delta Tank Manufacturing Co.37
which had required culpability on the part of the prevailing party.38
Most importantly, official revision comment (b) cited the language of
City of New Orleans v. LeBourgeois39 to the effect that courts should af-
ford relief without regard to inattention or neglect "when the circum-
stances under which the judgment is rendered show the deprivation of
the legal rights of the litigant who seeks relief, and when the enforcement
of the judgment would be unconscientious and inequitable."0
The Johnson v. Jones-Journet Decision
This language in comment (b) of article 2004 brought about a con-
flict with the equitable defenses of negligence and laches which was re-
solved in Johnson v. Jones-Journet.41 In Johnson, the plaintiff secured a
default judgment against two of six co-makers of a note bearing the lan-
guage: "We promise to pay."'42 The default judgment casting the defend-
ants as solidarily liable was not appealed.43 When the plaintiff filed a
motion to examine one of the judgment debtors, the defendant in the
original action sought to annul the judgment as not being obtainable at
law.44 The trial court dismissed the petition on an exception of no cause
of action.45
The court of appeals, declaring that solidary liability was unques-
tionably absent, held that the assertion of an insupportable claim of soli-
darity, even if accidental or made in ignorance, was an ill practice
justifying annullment.46 The court of appeals cited the language of offi-
cial revision comment (b) in reaching its conclusion and stated: "Art.
2004 is clear; 'A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be
annulled.' The default judgment here in question was obtained by what
37. 28 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
38. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2004, comment (c).
39. 50 La. Ann. 591, 23 So. 542 (1898).
40. Id This language reflects the initial application of the "two requirements" test
which the courts have continued to apply to actions under article 2004. See text at notes 23-
24, supra, and at notes 51-70, infra.
41. 320 So. 2d 533 (La. 1975), reversing 306 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
42. 306 So. 2d at 828.
43. Id
44. 320 So. 2d at 535.
45. Id at 538.
46. 306 So. 2d at 828.
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is objectively ill practice. Nothing else matters."'47 The dissenting judge
stressed the equitable background of the rule and argued that the de-
fendant had failed to meet the equitable conditions that one seeking re-
lief come before the court with clean hands and with a willingness to do
equity.48 He pointed out that the defendant and his attorney chose not to
answer after determining the defendant to be judgment-proof and that
the defendant became concerned only after assets left him by his de-
ceased father came to the attention of his creditor. 49 The dissenting opin-
ion interpreted article 2004 in light of its treatment in the jurisprudence
and criticized the majority's decision as prohibiting the enforcement of
any final judgment against any litigant who failed to assert a valid de-
fense because of his own inaction or because of incompetent counsel. 50
Applying a two step analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-
versed. The court found that the prayer and judgment of solidary liabil-
ity were substantially errors of law5' and that the defendant could not
use an action of nullity as a substitute for appeal by raising such errors of
law.52 The court held that the defendant had not met the two tests for
annulment because he did not claim a deprivation of his right to appear
and defend and because his failure to defend after personal service ne-
gated the unconscionability of the erroneous judgment.5 3
47. Id at 828 n.I. The court also stated in the footnote: "[C.]C.P. art. 2004 does not
deny its relief to the non-answerer or the non-appealer: if there must be a hierarchy of legal
principles, art. 2004's unqualified rule plainly outranks. The reason is evident: government
does not provide courts to abet fraud or ill practice; uprightness in courts of justice is more
important than swiftness or technical correctness in pleadings or procedure." Id
48. 306 So. 2d at 829.
49. Id
50. Id at 830. The dissenting opinion stressed that unconscionability in itself is insuffi-
cient to constitute ill practice and that two elements must concur to support annulment: (1)
some circumstance (either contrived or accidental) deprived the party cast in judgment of
an opportunity to present a defense; and (2) enforcement would be unconscionable and
inequitable. Id
51. 320 So. 2d at 538.
52. Id. at 537.
53. Id Jones-Journet argued that a judgment stipulating greater liability than he
should bear under the law deprived him of his legal rights. The court disagreed and stated
that erroneous judgments are the objects of appeals, not nullity actions. Id If a new trial or
the appellate process does not rectify an erroneous judgment the aggrieved party may be
without a remedy and must bear the result in the interest of stability of judgments. Cf
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Clemmons, 198 So. 2d 695, 699 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. denied 251
La. 27, 202 So. 2d 649 (1967) (the court disclaimed any factual or legal error on its part in
its original judgment in the case).
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The Two Requirements Test
a) Deprivation of Legal Rights
The court's application of the two step analysis in Johnson is consis-
tent with the prevailing jurisprudence. The decisions have repeatedly
recognized that "deprivation of legal rights" involves the denial of the
opportunity to appear or to assert a defense.54 Some decisions have char-
acterized the deprivation of legal rights as an issue of improper advan-
tage55 while others have spoken of the litigant's right to his day in court
regardless of the availability of an absolutely valid defense.56 Despite
differences in language, these decisions reflect a recognition that a depri-
vation of legal rights occurs when a litigant is denied a fair chance to
control the suit, notwithstanding that he might not prevail in a second
trial. For instance, in Alonso v. Bowers57 the plaintiff was able to secure a
default judgment on an open account by not serving a supplemental and
amended petition on the defendant's attorney. Although the defendant's
only defense was a denial of the correctness of the account, the court
held that Alonso was "entitled to his day in court to urge any defense
that he may have .... *58 Decisions which suggest that annulment is
54. Eg., GECC Leasing Corp. v. Lakeside Rambler Sales, Inc., 277 So. 2d 249, 251
(La. App. ist Cir. 1973); Estelle J. Wilson Mortuary, Inc. v. Walker, 244 So. 2d 630, 632
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Romero v. Galley, 79 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1955).
55. Succession of Gilmore, 157 La. 130, 133, 102 So. 94, 95 (1924); Millaudon v.
Gordon, 18 La. Ann. 280 (1866).
56. Alonso v. Bowers, 222 La. 1093, 64 So. 2d 443 (1953); Leidig v. Leidig, 187 So. 2d
201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). Some cases contain language indicating that a deprivation of
legal rights occurs in judgments which are legally or factually erroneous. E.g., St. Mary v.
St. Mary, 175 So. 2d 893, 897-98 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Bell v. Holdcraft, 196 So. 379, 382
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1940). But in these cases the erroneous and unfair result followed from a
deprivation of the opportunity to appear and defend. The demand for a valid de-
fense-which appears to be related to the equity rule requiring a meritorious de-
fense-overlooks the principle that if the original judgment was factually or legally
erroneous the proper remedy is a new trial or appeal. It is only because the litigant was
deprived of his right to appear that the court now gives him a second chance. The outcome
in a second suit is not a consideration if there was no opportunity for a fair contest in the
first proceeding.
57. 222 La. 1093, 64 So. 2d 443 (1953).
58. Id at 1101, 64 So. 2d at 445 (emphasis added). In this case the supplemental peti-
tion had been served on Alonso but he failed to inform his attorney of this fact. The court
excused the neglect of Alonso because of the statutory rule on service of pleadings on
counsel of record. In Leidig v. Leidig, 187 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), the court,
without any discussion of defenses to the suit, overturned a dismissal of a petition to annul
a divorce judgment secured through the ill practices of the plaintiff husband. The hus-
band's false allegations as to the wife's last known address and his failure to furnish the
attorney-curator with information that the wife could be served in St. Landry Parish effec-
tively deprived the wife of notice of the suit and any real chance to defend.
1978]
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improper unless a new trial would produce a different result 59 are ques-
tionable because the requirement of a valid defense presupposes that the
petitioner knowingly had the opportunity for his day in court.60 In in-
stances where the petitioner appeared and later wishes to assert a defense
not offered in the original suit because it was either unknown at the time
or not discoverable with reasonable diligence, courts have recognized
that the requirement of a meritorious defense does not mean that the
petitioner must demonstrate that a new trial would produce victory. 61
The equation of the deprivation of legal rights with the availability
of a valid defense may derive from the redactors' comments to article
2004 which cite Bell v. Holdcraf162 and Sandfield Oil and Gas Co. v.
Paul63 as support for City of New Orleans v. LeBourgeois. From these
cases one could conclude that the deprivation of legal rights entails the
deprivation of an absolutely valid defense.64 In Bell, the plaintiff secured
a default judgment on an unpaid account due to the failure of the de-
fendant's attorney to answer and assert the defense of payment sup-
ported by receipts. The attorney failed to answer because of a
misunderstanding concerning the payment of his fee. The defendant had
no knowledge that he was not represented until his property was seized
under a writ of fieri facias.65 In Sandfield, the confirmation of a prelimi-
nary default which had been abandoned after five years of inactivity was
the cause for nullification. 66
The requirement of deprivation of legal rights appears to have been
59. E.g., Tarver v. Quinn, 149 La. 368, 373, 89 So. 216, 218 (1921); Chinn v. First
Municipality of New Orleans, I Rob. 523, 524 (La. 1842); St. Mary v. St. Mary, 175 So. 2d
893, 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See the discussion in note 56, supra.
60. Isaacs v. Shoreland Hotel, 188 N.E.2d 776, 780 (I11. App. 1963); Lichter v. Scher,
123 N.E.2d 161, 164 (I11. App. 1954). Cf 5 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 2069
(4th ed. 1919) (when the fraud relates to the conduct of the suit, as where it prevents a party
from asserting his rights, there is no fair adversary proceeding and equity will interfere).
61. Gordon v. Halstead, 219 So. 2d 629, 631 (Ala. 1969); Olivera v. Grace, 122 P.2d
564, 569 (Cal. 1942). Cf. 3 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1188 (5th ed. 1925) (it must reason-
ably appear that if a new trial were granted the result would be other or different from that
already reached).
62. 196 So. 379 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
63. 7 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
64. See St. Mary v. St. Mary, 175 So. 2d 893, 896-97 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
65. 196 So. at 381.
66. 7 So. 2d at 726. The decision was not based on the equity rule for annulment but
on 1870 Code of Practice article 606 (Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2002) pro-
viding for annulment where a defendant has not had a regular default judgment taken
against him. The court determined that an abandoned suit lapses as a matter of law and
there can be no regular default where the suit is no longer pending. 7 So. 2d at 728.
[Vol. 38
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initially adopted in City of New Orleans v. LeBourgeois. 67 The supreme
court cited article 607 and three cases68 as authority for this requirement.
In LeBourgeois the court did not discuss the need for a valid defense and
held that a judgment secured against an opponent who has had no notice
of the demand or opportunity to defend should be annulled.69 The
qualification, that there must be a deprivation of legal rights, appears to
clarify the distinction between judgments which are unconscionable and
inequitable because of an improper advantage, and those judgments
which are merely harsh.
b) Unconscionability
The determination of a deprivation of legal rights is the first and less
difficult of the two inquiries. The question of unconscionability involves
assessing the harm done the petitioner and weighing his neglect against
this harm. The equity principles which influenced the early decisions on
nullification stipulated that negligence or laches on the part of the peti-
tioner destroyed the title to relief.70 The amplification of these equity
principles in LeBourgeois softened this harsh restriction and the court
openly admitted that it was comparing the equities. 7 I In LeBourgeois the
parties had attempted to bring a long-pending suit to trial. A date was
finally fixed but the city, having another case to try, sent an affidavit for
continuance and did not attend the trial. The opponent insisted on pro-
ceeding and filed a reconventional demand on which judgment was ren-
dered in the absence of counsel for the city.72 Although the city was not
free of negligence, the court determined that the general principles of the
adversarial system dictated annulment. 73 Hence, excusable neglect will
not defeat recovery under article 2004 if one side achieves an advantage
in the procurement of a judgment which it would be against good con-
science for him to keep.
The jurisprudence reveals no rules on when neglect may be excus-
able, but generally, annulment will not be proper where one litigant in-
67. 50 La. Ann. 591, 23 So. 542 (1898).
68. Swain v. Sampson, 6 La. Ann. 799 (1851); Norris v. Fristoe, 3 La. Ann. 646 (1848);
Chinn v. First Municipality of New Orleans, I Rob. 523 (La. 1842).
69. 50 La. Ann. at 593, 23 So. at 543. The court stated: "IT~he city has had no hearing
or opportunity of defense. Our decree simply secures that opportunity, and the delay can
work no injury comparable to that which the litigant sustains whose rights are adjudged
without that notice and means of defense, on general principles, the law secures to all."
70. 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 887 (2d ed. 1839); J. STORY, EQUITY
PLEADINGS § 414 (10th ed. 1892).
71. 50 La. Ann. at 593, 23 So. at 543. See note 69, supra.
72. Id at 592, 23 So. at 542.
73. Id. at 593, 23 So. at 543.
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excusably failed to appear, or, having appeared, was not sufficiently
diligent in contesting the issues. 74 Also, even if the party seeking annul-
ment be found faultless, the case may not meet the test of unconsciona-
bility if the rights of third parties could be affected adversely by
relitigation, or if the parties have acted to their substantial detriment in
reliance upon the judgment.75
Even so, the possibility exists that although a litigant behaves so
negligently that his right to relief under article 2004 should be denied,
annulment may be granted. There is occasion for such relief if mainte-
nance of the judgment would violate a clear expression of public policy
or if the judgment constituted an intolerable abuse of the courts.76 In
Tapp v. Guaranty Finance Co., 7 7 the court annulled a deficiency judg-
ment predicated upon a sale under executory process which was null for
lack of authentic evidence. The court found a strong legislative policy
prohibiting deficiency judgments without legal appraisal and determined
that an illegal order for executory process could not serve as the basis for
a legal appraisal and sale.78 In Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v.
Williams,79 the court held that it was contrary to public policy for a les-
sor to secure judgment condemning the lessee to pay the principal sum of
the lease while permitting the lessor to retake the leased property. 80 The
court granted annulment even though the petitioner, in both instances,
had neglected to protect his interests until his creditor sought execution
on the judgment.81
74. See text at notes 31-36, supra.
75. St. Mary v. St. Mary, 175 So. 2d 893, 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). Accord, Walsh v.
Walsh, 215 La. 1099, 1114, 42 So. 2d 860, 864, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1949).
76. Mid-Continent l efrigerator Co. v. Williams, 285 So. 2d 247, 251 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973) (judgment contrary to public policy); Johnston v. Smith, 284 So. 2d 149, 152 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1973) (intolerable abuse of the court); Tapp v. Guaranty Fin. Co., 158 So. 2d
228, 232-33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) (judgment contrary to public policy).
77. 158 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 245 La. 640, 160 So. 2d 228
(1964).
78. 158 So. 2d at 232-33, citing LA. R.S. 13:4106 (Supp. 1960). The Louisiana Supreme
Court applied the rationale of Tapp in League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery, 251
La. 971, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968).
79. 285 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
80. Id at 251, citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2692 and determining a contrary holding
would produce unjust enrichment.
81. How clear must the expression of public policy be before annulment is justifiable?
The judgment in Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Williams did not accord with the Civil
Code but this was also true in Johnson v. Jones-Journet and the judgment in Johnson was
arguably as offensive to public policy as the result in Mid-Continent. While the court in
Johnson v. Jones-Journet did not consider when public policy dictates annulment, the court
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In Johnston v. Smith8 2 an intolerable abuse of the court occurred in
a suit for attorney fees owed for representation in a separation proceed-
ing. The parties agreed to a fee of between $400 and $500, later raised to
$1000, but judgment was rendered in default for $3200 in attorney fees
plus costs. In confirming the default the attorney did not advise the court
of his earlier arrangements with his client.83 The court admonished that
an attorney should not practice deceit upon his client and that as an
officer of the court, the attorney's actions in confirming the default con-
stituted an imposition on the legal system.
84
Equitable Annulment Outside of Article 2004
Circumstances may arise after a judgment's rendition which make
its enforcement inequitable. This was the situation in Mack Trucks, Inc.
v. Martens.85 Mack Trucks had sued Martens on a note for a deficiency
judgment of $8,745.49.86 Martens filed a petition in bankruptcy but
reached a compromise agreement with Mack Trucks to discharge the
deficiency in full by paying $3500 in installments. Counsel for both sides
then prepared and signed a deficiency judgment which was to be recon-
veyed to Martens if the $3500 was timely paid or which could be
presented to the court for signing and recordation. Martens was tardy in
making payments but paid the agreed sum within three weeks of the due
date. In the meantime, without notification and after Martens had paid
$1000, Mack Trucks had submitted the deficiency judgment to the
court.87 Only later did the attorney for Mack Trucks inform Martens'
attorney that the compromise agreement was cancelled and that his cli-
ent expected Martens to pay the entire deficiency judgment.
did make clear that erroneous judgments, in themselves, are not sufficiently offensive to
justify annulment.
82. 284 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
83. Id The husband and wife reconciled after a trial on the merits but before briefs
were filed or the case submitted for a decision. After the termination, the attorney stated he
would accept $1000 in full payment of his fee, costs, and expenses. But he later billed his
client for $2400 attorney fees, courts costs of $125, and cost of transcript of $50. In the filing
of the suit, the attorney increased his fee to $3220 and the amount of costs, including tran-
script fee, to $361.98. The attorney is alleged to have made only three appearances in court
on behalf of his client on a case which did not require any special skill or training on the
part of the attorney who had been in practice for about one year.
84. Id at 152. The court relied in part on the fiduciary relationship between an attor-
ney and client. However, it cannot be pretended that at the time of the original suit the
relationship between the parties was one of trust.
85. 192 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
86. Id. at 881.
87. Id. at 882.
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The court found no fraud or ill practice on the part of Mack Trucks
because it had a right to proceed to judgment under the agreement. The
court recognized, however, that the agreement inured to the benefit of
both parties and that Martens had been misled, and therefore decided
that upon the general equity powers of articles 862 and 2164 of the Code
of Civil Procedure it would hold the deficiency judgment to be inopera-
tive and unenforceable.88
Application of the Rule
Instances in which petitioners succeed in nullity actions are numer-
ous, but generally the cases fall into four broad categories: nonappear-
ance, fraudulent testimony and pleadings, circumvention of procedural
law, and imposition on the court.
a) Non-appearance
Non-appearance is a frequent factual background in an action for
nullification. Violations of agreements not to prosecute a suit,89 promises
to notify the opponent of the date set for trial,90 and understandings that
no action would be taken until the opponent files an answer 9 ' have all
been deemed sufficient grounds for nullification when they resulted in
non-appearance. In Southern Discount Co. v. Williams,9 2 the loan com-
pany took a default judgment twelve calendar days after agreeing to give
88. Id at 884. The court also relied on Denis v. Gayle, 40 La. Ann. 286, 4 So. 3 (1888).
Cf Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 32 La.- Ann. 1245 (1880) (judgment enjoined where
occurrences subsequent to the judgment render execution of the judgment illegal and ineq-
uitable). In Licoho Enterprises, Inc. v. Succession of Champagne, 270 So. 2d 139 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1972), the court applied the rationale of Mack Trucks and Louisiana Civil Code
article 21 to declare inoperative a judgment that was clearly the result of fraud. But since
suit was brought in a parish of improper venue the court could not utilize Code of Civil
Procedure article 2004. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, determining that to render
a judgment inoperative and unenforceable was of the same effect as a declaration of nullity
and under Code of Civil Procedure articles 44 and 2006, the court was without jurisdiction
to render judgment. Licoho Enterprises, Inc. v. Succession of Champagne, 283 So. 2d 217
(La. 1973). The court did not comment on the propriety of the inherent power of a court to
do justice.
89. Eg., Estelle J. Wilson Mortuary, Inc. v. Walker, 244 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1971); Engeran v. Consolidated Cos., 147 So. 743 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1933). Cf Lazarus v.
McGuirk, 42 La. Ann. 194, 8 So. 253 (1890) (violation of a release).
90. Schneckenberger v. John Bonura & Co., 130 So. 870 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
91. Collins v. Collins, 325 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Southern Discount Co.
v. Williams, 226 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969). But cf. Stout v. Henderson, 157 La.
169, 102 So. 193 (1924) (plaintiff failed to prove that opposing counsel had acted contrary
to custom in confirming a default without notice to his opponent).
92. 226 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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its debtor reasonable additional time to file an answer. The action, com-
menced without notifying the debtor and without advising the court of
the extension agreement, allowed the debtor only five judicial days be-
yond the statutory entitlement. 93 The court, pretermitting whether lack
of professional courtesy is grounds for nullification,94 determined that,
absent the agreement, the opponent could have easily secured an exten-
sion of the time to answer and thereby prevented the default. The debtor
relied to his detriment on the agreement and its violation was a sufficient
ground for annulment. 95 In Engeran v. Consolidated Companies,96 an
agreement to dismiss a suit against the defendant was violated and a
default judgment resulted. The plaintiff had admitted its mistake in su-
ing Joseph Engeran over a debt owed by a partnership bearing the name
Engeran Bros. but completely unrelated to Joseph Engeran. 97 Since Jo-
seph Engeran was not liable for the debt the court held that enforcement
of the judgment would be unconscionable.98
Where the defendant's counsel fails to file an answer, however, an-
nulment may likely be denied.99 In Johnson v. Welsh, I° ° the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the failure of the defendant's attorney to an-
swer the petition or make any appearance did not constitute a ground
upon which a judgment of default could be set aside.' 0 ' But in Hall v.
Hall,10 2 wherein the plaintiff had secured a default judgment by utilizing
false documents and fraudulent testimony,t0 3 the neglect of the defend-
93. Id.
94. Id at 61.
95. Id at 62. The court did not discuss any defense the debtor may have had to the suit
on the note and chattel mortgage.
96. 147 So. 743 (La. App. ist Cir. 1933).
97. Id. at 744.
98. Id. at 746. Accor, Estelle J. Wilson Mortuary, Inc. v. Walker, 244 So. 2d 630 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1971) wherein the court annulled a default judgment secured in violation of
'an agreement not to prosecute. Mrs. Walker was deprived of her right to assert what ap-
peared to be a valid defense through the violation of an agreement not to prosecute if she
would aid the mortuary in locating the other named defendants. Mrs. Walker fulfilled her
part of the agreement but the mortuary secured a default judgment against her in spite of
the agreement.
99. Johnson v. Welsh, 334 So. 2d 395 (La. 1976); Adams v. Perriloux, 216 La. 566, 44
So. 2d 117 (1950). Cf. Community Constr. Co. v. Scott, 235 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970) (appeal 6f a default judgment rendered when attorney did not timely file an answer).
100. 334 So. 2d 395 (La. 1976).
101. Id at 397. The court was unmoved by the "equitable" argument of the defendant
husband against whom a default separation was granted for cruel treatment.
102. 127 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
103. Id at 349.
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ant's attorney did not defeat the action of nullity.'104
Misunderstandings on the defendant's part regarding his own repre-
sentation may result in nullification. Where the defendant reasonably be-
lieves that he has arranged for representation the courts have annulled
default judgments.10 5 But in Stanley v. Miller,10 6 the defendant had re-
lied on his insurer to defend for him and took no personal action in his
defense. The court refused to annul the default judgment, maintaining
that cases involving misunderstandings between client and attorney were
inapposite because attorneys are officers of the court and their actions
are subject to judicial inquiry. 107 The courts have also denied annulment
where the defendant failed to retain new counsel after the withdrawal or
death of his original counsel,' 08 but where the attorney withdraws with-
out notice to the client the courts have granted annulment. 0 9 Annul-
ment after non-appearance has also been granted where the plaintiff told
the defendant, who was ignorant of her rights, that the suit papers served
upon her were inconsequential and that no legal steps on her part were
required. 110
Even if the non-appearance is voluntary, the court may grant annul-
ment. In Vegas v. CheramieI 'I the defendants permitted a default judg-
ment in a suit to fix boundary lines because they were satisfied with the
boundary lines fixed by the surveyor in accordance with the parties' titles
as prayed for in the pleadings. 112 However, after the preliminary default
the judge ordered the surveyor to establish the boundaries according to
the boundary fixed in a former suit. The court held that the judge's ac-
tion in the trial court was improper and an ill practice sufficient for
104. Id. The case presents a situation wherein the court overlooked the defendant's
neglect in the face of an abuse of the judicial process.
105. St. Mary v. St. Mary, 175 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (uneducated defend-
ants relied on assurances of chief deputy sheriff that the suit was being handled by an
attorney). Cf Bell v. Holdcraft, 196 So. 379 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) (appeal of a default
judgment secured against a defendant who thought he was being represented in the suit).
106. 211 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
107. Id at 794.
108. Yeatman v. Louisiana State Bank, 25 La. Ann. 461 (1873); Millaudon v. Gordon,
18 La. Ann. 280 (1866).
109. Sterling v. Jones, 255 La. 842, 233 So. 2d 537 (1970) (dictum, nullification being
granted under LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 2002, invalid default judgment); Pertuit v. LeBlanc,
216 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
110. Quinn v. Brown, 159 La. 570, 572, 574, 105 So. 624, 625 (1925).
Ill. 80 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
112. Id. at 883.
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nullification. "13
b) Fraudulent Testimony and Pleadings
Louisiana courts will annul judgments secured through the use of
false testimony and fraudulent documents." 4 However, a simple failure
to disclose evidence, when unaccompanied by concealment, will not suf-
fice in an action of nullity. 115 In First National Life Insurance Co. v.
Bell, 1 6 the plaintiff in a nullity action alleged that the plaintiff in the
original suit had pretended to be unable to rise or to take the witness
stand in order to make the court believe that she was permanently dis-
abled. " 7 Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that Mrs. Bell's failure to call
her attending physician and her reliance on the testimony of the physi-
cian who had treated her some sixteen months prior to trial amounted to
a further fraud." 18 The court refused to annul the judgment and pointed
to the lack of diligence of the counsel for the insurance company:
[T]he acts complained of were performed openly,. . . and were
apparent to the representatives of the insurance company and all
other observers. The insurance company was represented by experi-
enced counsel ....
If the insurance company was not satisfied that the injuries of
Mrs. Bell were of a permanent nature, it was its duty to ascertain
and establish that fact on the trial of the case. This it failed to do,
and we do not think that it ought to be permitted to have the case
reopened . . . to engage in a retrial of that issue."19
A related rule holds that the plaintiff does not commit an ill practice
in confirming a default if he fails to disclose possible defenses available
to his adversary or if he presents merely his own version of the contro-
versy so long as he does not use false testimony.' 20 Also, allegations in
113. Id. at 884. Cf. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1703 (a judgment by default shall not be
different in kind from or exceed in amount that demanded in the petition).
114. Eg., Quinn v. Brown, 159 La. 570, 105 So. 624 (1925); Spence v. Spence, 158 La.
961, 105 So. 28 (1925); Bryant v. Austin, 36 La. Ann. 808 (1884).
115. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 174 La. 692, 141 So. 379 (1932); Succession of
Elrod v. Elrod, 253 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 La. 140, 255 So. 2d 358
(1971).
116. 174 La. 692, 141 So. 379 (1932).
117. Id
118. Id
-119. Id at 696, 698, 141 So. at 380.
120. Chauvin v. Nelkin Ins. Agency, 345 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977). Accord
Alleman v. Guillot, 225 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 254 La. 858, 227 So. 2d
596 (1969).
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the plaintiff's petition which may be partially or completely inaccurate
do not constitute grounds for annulment. 12' Where the petition is served
upon the opponent, he cannot complain when he fails to appear and
controvert the questionable allegations.122
c) Circumvention of Procedural Law
If the plaintiff deprives his opponent of the full protection which the
procedural law accords him, annulment is justified.123 A clear ill practice
occurs whenever the plaintiff falsely alleges that the defendant is an ab-
sentee and thereby denies him the opportunity to defend personally.' 24
Other irregularities are also sufficient to justify nullification. For in-
stance, in one case the court annulled a judgment procured after the
plaintiff notified an unrepresented defendant that the case was fixed for
trial the next morning. 2 5 These instances, like most others wherein an-
nulment is granted, involve procedural violations which prevent the op-
ponent from appearing and defending in the suit,' 2 6 whereas mere
technical violations are inadequate grounds for nullification.12 7
d) Imposition on the Court
Imposition on the court occurs when the plaintiff makes the court an
unwitting instrument of injustice.' 2 8 The typical setting in which the
court finds an imposition involves the taking of a default judgment after
an expressed agreement not to proceed or to delay action.' 2 9 In Spitzkeit
121. Eg., Royal Furniture Co. v. Benton, 260 La. 527, 256 So. 2d 614 (1972); Lyons v.
Fontenot, 344 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 328 So. 2d
719 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
122. Lyons v. Fontenot, 344 So. 2d 1068, 1071 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Vinson v.
Picolo, 15 So. 2d 778, 780 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943) (McCaleb, J., concurring).
123. Eg., Alonso v. Bowers, 222 La. 1093, 64 So. 2d 443 (1953); City of New Orleans
v. LeBourgeois, 50 La. Ann. 591, 23 So. 542 (1898); Bryant v. Austin, 36 La. Ann. 808
(1884).
124. Spence v. Spence, 158 La. 961, 105 So. 28 (1925); Bryant v. Austin, 36 La. Ann.
808 (1884); Leidig v. Leidig, 187 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
125. Duncan v. Pesnell, 219 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 La. 16, 222
So. 2d 67 (1969). But cf. Caraway v. Caraway, 321 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 So. 2d 479 (La. 1975) (the court determined that the plaintiff was familiar with
legal proceedings and chose not to appear).
126. Eg., Succession of Menendez, 238 La. 488, 115 So. 2d 829 (1959); Alonso v. Bow-
ers, 222 La. 1093, 64 So. 2d 443 (1953); City of New Orleans v. LeBourgeois, 50 La. Ann.
591, 23 So. 542 (1898).
127. Accardo v. Dimicelli, 226 La. 435, 76 So. 2d 521 (1954); Tarver v. Quinn, 149 La.
368, 89 So. 216 (1921).
128. 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 885 (2d ed. 1839).
129. Eg., Lacoste v. Robert, 11 La. Ann. 33 (1856); Spitzkeit v. Robinson, 289 So. 2d
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v. Robinson,'30 the plaintiff filed suit for past due rent, but after the filing
of the suit and service of process the plaintiff advised the lessee that he
had no intention of proceeding in the action against her.' 31 The court
annulled even though notice of trial was served upon the lessee's counsel
who nonetheless did not appear at trial.132
Conclusion
The action for nullity under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure arti-
cle 2004 serves to prevent injustices which cannot be corrected through
new trials and appeals. 133 Although a full categorization of the instances
in which the remedy is proper would be impossible, the two requiire-
ments test aids the court in the exercise of its discretion. There must be a
deprivation of the basic right of the adversarial system: the opportunity
to appear and defend. The deprivation must also be unconscionable and
inequitable. This consequence will normally follow from the first re-
quirement unless the complaining party, through his own negligence and
delay, has contributed to the harm which he now protests. However,
complete absence of fault is not a requirement for relief, and neglect, if
excusable, will not defeat an action for annulment if after a balancing of
the equities, enforcement of the judgment appears unconscionable. Al-
though public policy requires that opposing litigants accept primary re-
sponsibility for the protection of legal rights,' 34 occasionally the
adversarial system proves inadequate because of factors which deprive a
litigant of the opportunity to appear or which prevent a litigant from
presenting defenses which may produce a different result. In these in-
stances the prevention of injustice transcends the need for stability in
judgments.
Robert G. Nida
846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Estelle J. Wilson Mortuary, Inc. v. Walker, 244 So. 2d 630
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971). Cases of imposition though usually associated with non-appear-
ance are distinguishable because the failure to appear is the result of a more palpable
deception than in other instances of non-appearance. Compare Spitzkeit v. Robinson, 289
So. 2d 846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971) with Southern Discount Co. v. Williams, 226 So. 2d 60
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
130. 289 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
131. Id
132. Id
133. Projet of La. Code of Practice of 1825 at 97 (Official Reprint, 1938).
134. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 126, Comment a (1942).
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